新經濟學與台灣戴明圈: The New Economics and A Taiwanese Deming Circle

「華人戴明學院」是戴明哲學的學習共同體 ,致力於淵博型智識系統的研究、推廣和運用。 The purpose of this blog is to advance the ideas and ideals of W. Edwards Deming.


The Price of the GM Recalls: Advice for Mary Barra; 我與通用汽車公司:global product integrity organization

Whether General Motors should take its recalled cars off the road is up to federal transportation authorities, a judge has ruled, marking a victory for the company as it faces a legal battle related to the recall of 2.6 million vehicles over faulty ignition switches

A U.S. judge said Thursday that recalled General Motors cars can stay on the road, a major victory for the company as it faces an uphill legal battle related to 2.6 million vehicles recently recalled over malfunctioning ignition switches.
The decision came in a lawsuit brought against them by a couple seeking compensation for the lost value of their recalled 2006 Chevrolet Cobalt. Their Cobalt was recalled along with millions of other GM vehicles after it was discovered the cars’ ignition switches can be inadvertently set to “off” while the car is being operated, disabling power steering and other features. The ignition switch problem has been linked to at least 13 deaths.
The couples’ lawsuit demanded “park it now” notices for every vehicle included in the recall, which would’ve forced owners of the affected cars to keep their vehicles off the road. GM opposed issuing such notices, claiming the car is safe if nothing is attached to the keyin the ignition and arguing that taking all affected cars off the road would be a logistical nightmare.
The judge in the case ruled that determining whether the cars need to be taken off the road is up to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration.
Although the judge’s decision is a win for GM, it’s just one in a growing series of legal battles against the company for the ignition issue, which the company has reportedly known about for years.

Wide-Ranging Recall
The departures of General Motors’ chief spokesman and head Washington adviser, and its top human resources executive are the first major changes in the automaker’s senior management since a recall in February.
這種事,   Alfred Sloan 會如何處理?

用汽車公司(General Motors Co.)首席執行長Mary Barra稱,該公司計劃在其產品開發團隊中設立一個全球產品整合部門 ( 這翻譯有點問題: global product integrity organization) ,這一部門將涵蓋該公司不久前成立的產品安全部門。


通用汽車首席執行長Mary Barra稱,計劃在其產品開發團隊中設立一個名為global product integrity organization 的部門,該部門將涵蓋公司不久前成立的產品安全部門。

Henry Ford is rightly credited with inventing the assembly line—and with it mass production. But it was his great rival at General Motors (GM), Alfred Sloan, who really invented modern professional management. Sloan organised his company into divisions that specialised in cars “for every purse and purpose” and he fashioned a managerial class that turned GM into the world’s biggest company. His 1964 book, My Years with General Motors, is a cool explanation of how he did it (“management has been my specialisation,” he wrote flatly). It is a book that puts subsequent business autobiographies to shame.


GM's Opel Accelerates Its Path to Profitability1

  My Years with General Motors By Alfred Sloan  我與通用汽車公司  台北:協志,1971


The Price of the GM Recalls: Advice for Mary Barra


It is about as big a corporate crisis as anyone could imagine: a defective product that leads to deaths, denials and cover-ups, a sluggish corporate response to grieving families, and a government investigation that has raised its own questions of accountability. General Motors does not stand alone in the recall hall of shame, but a combination of its venerable brand and recent storyline — including a promising comeback from bankruptcy, now threatened — gives the revelations of the last few months a particularly powerful punch. What did GM know, who knew it and when?
As the wait for answers goes on, there is a company to run and a crisis to manage that could either cripple GM or empower it. Though several acts remain to be played out in this drama, experts in corporate governance and crisis management say that so far, GM and the woman in the hot seat, CEO Marry Barra, are doing a decent — but not stellar — job of managing the fallout.
“Mary Barra seems to fully embody the position of the CEO who is sorry. She recognizes that she has to pass on the [corporation’s] deepest regrets, and I think she’s been pretty convincing on that score,” says Wharton professor of legal studies and business ethics Amy Sepinwall. “Also notable, she wants us to understand that GM recognizes the error of its ways to the point where it’s not the same company in some meaningful sense. I think that is a powerful trope. We are inclined to forgive sinners when they have changed their character to the extent that it is almost a rupture in their identity.”

GM has recalled 2.6 million cars, mostly Chevrolet Cobalts and Saturn Ions, after revelations that a faulty ignition switch could shut down the engine, lock steering and power breaks, and disable airbags. The flaw has been linked to at least 13 deaths. Barra, who took the helm at GM in January and is the first female CEO of a major international automaker, was called before Congress to explain why the company spent a decade doing nothing about the problem. In one particularly shameful case, GM had threatened to go after a victim’s family for legal fees if they did not drop a lawsuit against the automaker, The New York Times reported.
It’s a critical moment because the recall scandal comes just as GM was coming back to life, says David Vinjamuri, author of the book, Accidental Branding. “They had finally started to get the bankruptcy behind them, they have had some very well reviewed products … [and] they seemed to be firing on all cylinders,” he notes. “This is really a potential inflection point where they show that they are a company that can break the mold” in terms of how they handle a crisis, “or fall back into an old pattern.” That old pattern, Vinjamuri adds, would be choosing “to minimize the cost of the crisis rather than maximizing the value of the brand long term.”
Echoes of Exploding Pintos
Lawrence G. Hrebiniak, emeritus professor of management at Wharton, points out that recalls, cover-ups and threatening behavior by GM carry some historical resonance. “If you look at the auto industry, they don’t come across as clear, decisive and positive. In 1965, Ralph Nader wrote Unsafe at Any Speed [which documented car manufacturers’ resistance to adopting safety equipment, such as seat belts]. The auto industry not only denied [these accusations], they went as far as digging up dirt on Nader rather than facing the problem head on,” he notes. “Nader won a ton of money in a judgment against GM. Shortly after that, there was the [controversy involving the Ford] Pinto and the exploding fuel tank. There is a history here.”
“Mary Barra seems to fully embody the position of the CEO who is sorry.”–Amy Sepinwall
In the case of the Pinto, in which a rear-impact collision could result in an exploding fuel tank, it was discovered that an $11 shield could have diminished risk. The more recent GM case centered on a 57-cent part inside the cars’ ignition switches. In both instances, it seems companies made a particularly cold-hearted calculation — that settlements to families of victims would cost less than a recall. “As consumers and concerned citizens, we think this is not the right way to proceed even if it turns out that the bottom line is enhanced by paying money out in liability payments,” says Sepinwall. “Liability of course never fully compensates the family for the loss that occurs. There is a moral cost to the tragedy, and there really is no price tag assigned to that.”
GM, however, will end up paying for its transgressions many times over, and, at least at this early stage, the Detroit-based automaker is doing many things right, according to veteran crisis management experts and observers. “I do have a lot of respect and admiration for [Barra],” says John Paul MacDuffie, a Wharton management professor and longtime auto industry researcher. “I think she probably is, more than anyone else within GM, the right person to get them out of this crisis.”
MacDuffie points out that Barra, a GM lifer, has real auto-industry credibility that other recent GM CEOs have lacked. “In several of her assignments before this, she was a voice for breaking from the old GM ways: [She worked] in manufacturing, in HR, in product development, and then [was appointed] CEO,” he notes. “In a company where a lot of CEOs came up through the financial side, she came up through the car side.” This means Barra has the potential for changing, in reality and perception, GM’s reputation for emphasizing cost cutting above all else, MacDuffie adds.
Hrebiniak, however, thinks Barra could be presenting a stronger, more positive case for the company. “I feel sorry for her. She is stepping into a mess,” he says. “But she is just not offering positives and not fighting some of the charges strongly enough.” Barra could have said, for instance, that starting this summer, all of GM’s cars will come with 4G technology that will automatically communicate more early-warning mechanical problems directly to the company, Hrebiniak suggests.
Still, some metrics show that GM’s image is holding up in spite of the controversy. March figures for the automaker’s U.S. sales showed a 4.1% year-to-year increase. Boston-based social media analytics firm Crimson Hexagon examined several million Twitter messages with the terms “GM” and “recall” sent between February 7 and April 1, well into coverage of the scandal. It shows 42% neutral tweets and 58% negative ones.
Tweets sorted simply for mention of GM brands overall did not show significantly negative drift as the scandal unfolded, Crimson Hexagon found. Between January 1 and February 7, 3.7 million tweets about GM and its sub-brands were 26% positive, 71% neutral and 3% negative. From February 7 to April 1, 5.3 million Tweets showed up as 24% positive, 72% neutral and 4% negative. “At the brand level, we don’t actually see much difference between the two time periods, which suggests that the recalls aren’t hurting the brand overall,” says Crimson Hexagon’s Elizabeth B. Breese, senior content and digital marketing strategist.
But these samplings dipped into public sentiment just as Barra’s testimony before Congress was getting underway on April 1 and 2. Days later, Saturday Night Live led off its weekly broadcast with a spoof on Barra’s performance, showing her trying to roll her chair out of hearings in a comically evasive routine.
“Knowing people are looking askance at the fox guarding the henhouse, they should invite someone from the outside … who can sit with the committee and examine the data.”–Lawrence Hrebiniak
Meanwhile, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) yesterday levied a $28,000 fine on GM because of what it said was the company’s failure to provide information the government had requested about the recall. That information had been due on April 3, according to press reports. At the same time, the NHTSA itself is under investigation by a congressional committee for what some allege was its delayed response to complaints from consumers about the ignition switch.
The Buzz in Competitors’ Showrooms
“You can bet salesmen in Ford, Honda and Kia showrooms, and the dozens of other competitors GM has, are making comments, and those comments are going to have some impact,” states Gene Grabowski, senior strategist at public relations/crisis management firm Levick.
Furthermore, GM has a significant disadvantage compared to the gold standard in crisis management. In 1982, a 12-year-old girl in Elk Grove Village, Ill., became the first victim of cyanide-laced extra-strength Tylenol capsules. Seven people died in that product tampering case, and the culprit was never caught. Johnson & Johnson responded almost immediately with a massive recall: 31 million bottles as part of a total effort costing well over $100 million. The financial losses, however, were only short-term. Market share recovered after a year, and the company emerged as a hero. How did they do it? “They said the value of life was a lot more important than the business case. This was quick, decisive and wonderful action,” says Hrebiniak.
A strategy of this kind, however, requires that the entire organization focus on the long-term reputation and health of the company. Says Vinjamuri: “The instinct of a large corporation is self-preservation, and at a large public company, the CEO tends to be judged by market valuation in the short term. The decisions [then-J&J CEO James E. Burke] made are not the ones the in-house counsel and CFO are going to tell [a CEO] to do today because it potentially has a very big, immediate and unknown financial liability when you admit liability and actively recall.”
GM, which has more than 200,000 employees around the world, also lacks one key advantage that Tylenol had — an outside perpetrator as culprit, rather than what is now perceived as inside callousness. Tylenol was responding to a crime committed by someone else. On the other hand, GM perhaps has an advantage in that J&J did not have a woman as CEO. “As a speculative matter, I might say that compassion sounds more genuine coming from a woman,” says Sepinwall, who carries the thought one step further: “I would be really troubled if the board of directors saw this was coming down the pike [while choosing a new leader] and felt it would be better to have a woman as CEO.”
According to Grabowski, Barra did a “credible” job in front of Congress, although he points out that one goal of such hearings is for politicians to gain points for being tough. She missed an important messaging opportunity by bringing the staff with her that she did, he adds. “There are these older white men all around her, and as she is speaking about the new GM, these old white guys are scowling. The optics were wrong. I was very surprised that, in 2014, they would have missed something as obvious as that.”
“The instinct of a large corporation is self-preservation, and at a large public company, the CEO tends to be judged by market valuation in the short term.”–David Vinjamuri
What Barra did do, though, is bring news — something seemingly concrete — for the media to put in their headlines and in the leads of their stories: She announced that GM had engaged Kenneth Feinberg, who specializes in administering disaster funds to victims, although she did not offer anything specific about whether GM will establish such a fund.
“That’s what we teach people to do who go before a hearing – to have a bold stroke, because that way you can report something rather than getting beat up, and it gives people on the panel a reason to praise you,” says Grabowski. “You make an announcement, you show a full page ad of something you are doing, or you form a new blue ribbon panel.”
Barra has been criticized for not revealing all the facts of what led to the problems with the cars. “I heard a lot of ‘we’re-investigating-it,’ but I didn’t get a lot of real answers,” one father of a victim told The New York Times. But there are likely legal reasons for not saying more. “It’s so easy to sit on the sidelines and judge people under these pressure situations,” Grabowski notes. “In nearly every case I have seen, the best you can do is emerge from the crisis with an understanding among consumers that you managed the crisis as best you could.”
To be in business in the 21st century, he adds, “is to live in crisis — consumers understand that. If the company manages this crisis well, there is a good opportunity to build its GM brand in the future. Companies have done this. They can leverage the crisis as a positive for their reputation.”
Undoing Wrongs by Doing Good
Projecting the right message and actually doing the right thing are usually one and the same. Making sure this kind of scandal never happens again means changing the prevailing corporate culture, says Eric W. Orts, a Wharton professor of legal studies and business ethics. “What you need to do is look at the actual incentive structure. If someone raises a significant safety issue, you need to reward [that person] for making an ethical decision even though it’s going to cost the company a little bit of money.”
A system that ensures anonymity within the company for reporting problems can also help, he notes. And although this would represent a major change, companies could consider restoring a responsible corporate officer doctrine, which would make members of the corporate board financially — and even criminally — liable for events that happen on their watch. “We don’t have that in the law right now, but it would certainly change the board’s attitude,” Orts points out. “You have this view that has taken over the world — if all a corporation should do is maximize value, then that’s what you are going to get.”
Experts say GM is moving in the right direction in some areas, such as meeting with families of victims and hiring Feinberg. The company has also brought aboard crisis management veteran Jeff Eller for advice. But there are other options open to the company that will help determine whether this ends up being a major collision, or just a particularly nasty speed bump. GM is conducting an internal investigation, but such endeavors may not carry much credibility if not handled correctly.
“There are these older white men all around [Barra], and as she is speaking about the new GM, these old white guys are scowling.”–Gene Grabowski
“Knowing people are looking askance at the fox guarding the henhouse, they should invite someone from the outside … who can sit with the committee and examine the data,” Hrebiniak says. “There needs to be a perception of legitimacy, that it’s not a cover-up. Structurally, it would be good to turn around and add one or two people to the committee who are outsiders.” The team is currently being led by Tony Valukas, chairman of law firm Jenner & Block and a former U.S. Attorney, and by GM’s own general counsel, Michael Millikin.
GM has indicated that although it may be shielded from liability for actions that occurred before its 2009 bankruptcy, it could choose to compensate all victims and their families. That is a potentially powerful action, according to Vinjamuri. “The most loyal customer isn’t someone who never had a problem,” he notes. “It is the person who had a problem who was surprised with a solution that exceeded [his or her] expectations. So the crisis represents an opportunity.” GM should be compensating pre-bankruptcy victims, he adds, “because it is the right thing to do [and] people will remember it.”
GM could find a different way to compensate victims, something with a more altruistic ring to it than just paying out cash, adds Sepinwall: “Sometimes companies will have scholarship funds, or in Philip Morris’s case, have public service messages aimed at discouraging kids from smoking — some effort that seeks to do good beyond the most immediate costs of the wrong-doing.”
The company might also take a page from Toyota, notes MacDuffie. Faced with product flaws, Toyota began in 2009 a series of recalls — so many, in fact, that it may have started to have a paradoxical effect on public perception. “There was a time when recalls had negative associations,” MacDuffie says. “But Toyota decided to get in front of potential recalls, and for a while it seemed there was a new Toyota recall every few weeks. In the end, there may have been some desensitizing, some reframing of what this means, that if Toyota is doing a recall, that’s a good thing.” Toyota also arranged to keep service centers open later and compensated those businesses for doing so – moves that meant a lot to dealers and customers, MacDuffie adds. “To anyone from the outside, it was a sign that Toyota was taking it seriously.” Toyota on April 9 announced that it was recalling more than six million vehicles worldwide for five different defects that impact 27 different Toyota models, in addition to the company-built Pontiac Vibe and Suburu Trezia. No deaths or crashes have been linked to the defects, the company said, but at least two fires were found to be related to a defective starter.
Of course, putting things right does not ensure brand value in perpetuity. For all the praise Tylenol garnered after the 1982 recall, it received just as much criticism more recently after a moldy smell turned out to emanate from rogue substances mixing with Tylenol in manufacturing plants, causing nausea, stomach pain and other health problems. Several rounds of recalls followed. “We have young children,” says Vinjamuri, “and a lot of parents say they don’t trust Tylenol. It was unthinkable that anyone would have said that 10 years ago.”


The New Economics by W. Edwards Deming 細讀 I

The New Economics

作者:William Edwards Deming


戴明的新經濟觀 戴久永譯天下文化出 版 社1997

   服務業也是如此,顧客只是接受現有的服務(洗衣、郵遞、交通),而不會發明什麼。但顧客學習得很快。如果快遞業出現隔天送達服務,即使它的價格是郵資的數倍,顧客也會選擇這種新服務。他忘掉在其他的開發國家的郵政系統很好,只須去買張郵票,就可能有隔夜送達的服務。(譯按: 參考 )--漏譯

   沒有顧客自己會先想到去要求發明心臟脈拍調整器 (pacemaker---誤譯),也沒有顧客會要求脈拍調整器的電池要能耐用十年、它同時又能夠儲存過去一個月來心跳速度與規律的資訊。


導讀 誨人不倦的品管大師 戴久永
緒言 戴明‧卡奚爾/戴明‧芮克里夫
第一章 現況的省思
第二章 跳脫現代管理的歧途
第三章 建立系統的觀念
第四章 淵博知識體系
第五章 領導者的特質
第六章 人員的管理
第七章 紅珠實驗的教訓
第八章 蕭華德與管制圖
第九章 漏斗實驗的啟示
第十章 來自變異的教訓
附錄  顧客與供應商應建立持久關係
譯後記 戴久永


先父於一九九三年十二月去世之前,一直孜孜不倦地修訂本書,希望第二版的內容更清楚,同時也是直接回應第一版許多讀者的評論與建議。他所關注的焦點,仍然 是幫助人們獲得必要的知識,以轉型為新的管理方式。轉型之道,就是應用他在本書中所勾勒的「淵博知識體系」(System of Profound Knowledge)。


一九九三年十一月,先父設立了戴明研究所(W. Edwards Deming Institute)。這個研究所的宗旨,在於培養對於戴明淵博知識體系的了解,以促進商業、繁榮與和平。在諸多認同這個主旨的人士的幫助與努力之下,我們將致力實現他的遺志。


( 戴安娜‧戴明‧卡奚爾(Diana Deming Cahill)疃 琳達‧戴明‧芮克里夫(Linda Deming Ratcliff) )

畉 今天,人類不再孤立生活,這是資訊跨越國界,流通於各國之間的結果。電影、電視、錄影機以及傳真機,能夠在瞬間告訴我們其他人的事,他們如何生活,他們享受什麼。而大家相互比較之下,每個人都希望生活得像其他人一樣,每個人都認為別人過得比較好。畉
 要如何才能活得和其他人一樣好?民眾為了生活不好而責備政府與領導人,或是責備企業與企業主管,也許是對的,但是換人領導就一定會改善生活嗎?萬一新領導 人並不比舊的好怎麼辦?他們憑什麼會比較好?新領導人又有多少時間,可讓他們證明確實改善了大家的生活?換句話說,民眾的耐性有多久?他們用什麼作為判定 的基準?畉
   一九二○年,從明尼蘇達州米沙比礦場(Mesabi Range)挖出來的鐵礦,含鐵量為七四%。如今的含鐵量卻只剩三三%。由於含鐵量太低,因此鋼鐵公司先就地把鐵砂煉成含鐵量七四%的鐵塊,以節省由鐵路 運至碼頭、再以船運到克里夫蘭(Cleveland)的成本。米沙比礦場目前仍然有很多鐵礦,年產量可達五千萬噸,但是精華已經挖盡。同樣地,森林也會消 失。以外匯收入而言,美國最賺錢的出口品應該是廢金屬。畉
   美國曾經對於新知識的發明以及應用貢獻良多。一九一○年,美國生產了全世界一半的製品。由一九二○年起的幾十年期間,美國製的產品遍及全世界數以百萬計 人的手中,若非具備有效率的生產與充沛的天然資源,是不可能做到的。由於美國貨的品質夠好,用過的人會想買更多的美國產品。北美的另外一項優勢,是在二次 世界大戰之後的十年,相較於其他工業國家都曾經遭受戰火的蹂躪,它是唯一有能力全力生產的區域。世界其他地方,全都是美國的顧客,願意向美國購買任何產 品,而美國也因貿易順差而有大量資金流入。畉
  當時最好的出口品之一,也是最賺錢的項目之一,就是軍用物資。如果不必顧慮道德理由,美國可以大 幅擴張這項收入。此外,美國飛機約占世界巿場的七○%。另一項重要出口品是廢金屬︰美國無法利用,所以將之賣掉。結果,日本人付一毛八分,購買製造麥克風 所用的金屬,然後美國人再花二千或一千八百美元,向日本買回這些金屬麥克風──這就是附加價值!再來,廢紙板和紙也賺錢,化學物品也賣得很好,就跟醫藥物 品一樣。同時木材很賺錢,而木材可以再生。據我所了解,營建設備也是美國重要的出口品。美國電影──這項服務業當然很賺錢。銀行與保險業也一度很重要,幾 乎可以與英國比美;但是好景不再,美國最大的銀行,如今在世界上的排名已遠遠落後了。畉
  每個人都希望好景持續,並且愈 來愈好。在擴展中的巿場,經營企業很容易,同時業者也會傾向假設經濟狀況會愈來愈好。然而,當我們回顧過去,卻與期望相反,發現我們已歷經了三十年的經濟 衰退。想確認某次地震發生的日期很容易,但要確認出經濟到底從什麼時候開始衰退卻不簡單。畉
   然而美國目前有些產業卻比過去任何時候都要好。美國汽車數目比過去任何時候都多,空中旅行也更頻繁。這種數字意謂著衰退?還是進步?在回答時必須考慮一 項因素︰一九五八年時,美國各地有行駛城巿間的火車,乘客可以選擇飛機或火車。如今,火車服務很少,唯一的選擇是撘飛機或自己開車。
   有一位先生在我的研討會中提出一個問題︰「哪有什麼危機?我們公司和其他的美國同業,合計占有全世界七成的飛機巿場。」我的回答是,一家健全、績效良好 的公司,正是處於改進管理、產品、服務的最佳時機,同時也有最大的改進義務,這樣做可以對本身以及其他人的經濟福祉有所貢獻。對於獨占的企業而言,事實上 它有逐年改善的最佳機會,同時也有最大的義務要如此做。那些岌岌可危的公司,唯一想到的事是︰眼前短期的茍延殘喘。畉
   顧客不會創造出什麼。例如,當初沒有顧客要求電燈︰他們認為瓦斯燈照明的效果已經不錯了;而且,最早期電燈的碳絲脆弱又耗電。又例如,當初沒有顧客要求 照相術,沒有顧客要求電報或電話,更沒有顧客要求汽車︰我們有馬,還有什麼比牠更好?沒有顧客要求充氣輪胎︰這些車胎都是用橡膠做的,想「騎在空氣上」似 乎很傻;美國第一個充氣輪胎並不好用,使用者必須攜帶橡皮膠、插頭和打氣筒,同時還要知道如何使用。此外,也沒有顧客要求積體電路、口袋型收音機,或傳真 機。畉
  一位受過教育的人,或許明確知道自己的需要,知道自己想買什麼,或許也能描述這些需要,讓供應商了解。然而聰明的顧客還是會聽取供應商 的建議,並從中學習。雙方應該如同一個系統在一起商議,而不是一方想壓過另一方。這是我在《轉危為安》一書中所提到管理十四要點中的第四點。我們會在第三 章更深入討論。畉
疬癔經由創新而得到一種性能更好的新產品,當然很不錯。但是創新源自何處?畉 化油器的製造者如今何在?過去每一輛車都至少有一個化油器。汽車沒有化油器哪能跑?化油器的製造者年年都在改進品質。它的顧客都快樂而忠誠。畉
   接下來發生了什麼事?創新。燃油噴射器誕生了,除了化油器的功能,它還有其他功能。燃油噴射器比化油器貴得多,但是一經某一車款採用,所有車款都跟進。 化油器出局了,甚至卡車也不再使用它,年復一年,很少人還記得它。畉 過些時候,燃油噴射器也會被取代。將汽油與空氣噴入燃燒室的新方法與新引擎將會誕 生,把燃油噴射器淘汰掉。畉
  很少有人會記得真空管,但過去的收音機必須用到真空管。八個真空管的收音機很占空間,九個真空管的收音機效果比八 個真空管的好,但是更占空間。真空管的製造商每年都改進性能,並縮小體積。顧客都快樂而忠誠。但是當貝爾電話實驗室(Bell Telephone Laboratories)的蕭克利(William Shockley)等人,透過對二極體及電晶體的研究而發明了積體電路,真空管的快樂顧客便放棄了真空管,轉而追求口袋型收音機。
   以上各種敘述,或許可以用一個問題概括︰「我們從事的是哪種行業?」在化油器的個案中,是否就是製造化油器?沒錯。化油器的製造商製造優良的化油器,而 且愈做愈好。他們認為,自己所從事的是製造化油器的行業。然而事實上,如果當初他們把自己的行業視為是將汽油與空氣注入燃燒室,或是發明更好的引擎,也許 情況會不同。結果,別人發明了燃油噴射器,讓化油器的製造商面臨困境。畉
  對於任何經營企業的人來說,一個值得思考的好問題是︰「我們到底從事 的是哪種行業?」將我們所做的事做好──生產出好產品,或是好服務──當然是必要的,但是這並不夠。我們必須不斷地問︰「什麼產品或服務更能幫助我們的顧 客?」我們必須思考未來︰我們五年後將做什麼?十年後將做什麼?畉
疬癔沒有缺點並不必然等於能夠建立事業,也不必然能夠保 持工廠營運(參看圖一),要做的事還很多。例如,在汽車業中,顧客──就是讓工廠能維持開門與營運的人──或許對於汽車的性能感興趣,而且關心的問題不只 是加速,也包括在雪地上的表現,在高速下駕駛盤的狀況,還有駛過突出路面時的情況。車子在粗石路面上是否會跳起並打滑?空調運作得如何?暖氣系統又如何? 畉
   在車門的邊上少用一些橡皮,就可以更容易地關上車門,但是雨水會滲進來,同時快速行駛時有風的噪音。如果在車門邊多加橡皮,就可阻止雨水進入,也減少噪 音,但只有很強壯的人才關得上車門。降低任何一項因素,就會使其他因素到達令人無可忍受的地步。問題是該如何達成平衡,讓這三項因素都在可忍受的程度以 內。
  目標管理(MBO, management by objective)
  成果導向的管理(MBR, management by result)
  加強統計品管(SQC, statistical quality control)畉
   在參觀我擔任顧問的公司中,我發現過多自動化與過多的新機器,乃是低品質與高成本的源頭,也導致很多公司破產;就算能符合預定目的而運作,實際產能卻超 出需要產能的一倍。有些則是流程設計不良,諸如︰製造→檢驗、製造→檢驗、製造→檢驗……,一再重複其實檢驗並非是最經濟的程序(參閱《轉危為安》第十五 章)。此外,檢驗儀器所帶來的困擾,通常也比製造設備所帶來的麻煩來得多。
  「電腦化的品質資訊系統,可提供高科技與有效決策之間的重要聯繫。」畉 我倒希望管理真的這樣簡單。畉
   品質必須由高階管理者決定,不可能授權此人。此外,上述那些說詞也欠缺我所稱的淵博知識這項要素。知識是無可替代的,只靠埋頭苦幹、全力以赴,或是竭智 盡心,並不能創造出品質或巿場。管理必須轉型(transformation)──學習並應用淵博知識。我將在第四章介紹淵博知識體系的大要。畉
  位於曼菲斯(Memphis)附近的聖心聯盟(Sacred Heart League),設定了一項目標,就是要為田納西州四郡的貧困兒童提供醫療照顧和食物。為了籌得所需款項,該聯盟向郵寄名單上所列的人士募款。募款相關的流程可用圖三表示。畉
  圖三的流程圖,列出聖心聯盟的作業過程,如果受過一點流程圖的訓練,不難重新繪製出如圖四的配置流程圖(deployment flow chart)。畉

第 33 頁
In my experience, most troubles and most possibilities for improvement add up to proportions something like this:
94% belong to the system (the responsibility of management)
6% are attributable to special causes
中文(第四十頁)的翻譯有點走調了 幾乎完全不管原文的用字之用心

我們可以比較一下他的寫作之改善 看 Out of the Crisis (1986)
第 315 頁
I should estimate that in my experience most troubles and most possibilities for improvement add up to proportions something like this:
94% belong to the system (the responsibility of management)
6% special

   也許,《戴明的新經濟觀》能夠提供許多讓人茅塞頓開的想法。在傳統經濟管理制度的桎梏下,企業對外強調競爭,對內則以績效掛帥,員工無法樂在工作,企業 的效率難以充分發揮。而戴明所倡導的觀點,正是要打破這些傳統的迷思,以系統與變異的理念,創造人人皆贏的局面。(CB156)


「品質之神」戴明一九OO年出生於美國愛荷華州,一九二八年獲耶魯大學數學物理學博士,一九五O年至日本擔任產業界之講師及顧問,一九五六年榮獲天皇裕仁 頒發之二等瑞寶獎。一生得獎無數。享壽甚高,逝於一九九三年十二月。戴明終年游走世界各地,介紹著名的四日研討會,每年有上萬人前來聽講。為了紀念他早年 對日本產業發展的貢獻,日本科技連並以他為名設立了戴明獎。一九八O年,NBC播出「日本能,我們為什麼不能」節目後,戴明的理念在美國颳起了一陣品質革 命旋風,大幅提升了美國的生產力與競爭地位。


中原理工學院數學系畢業。美國新墨西哥大學統計碩士、博士。民國六十五年回國在國立交通大學管理學院任教至今。曾經在美國奧克拉荷馬州立大學工業工程與管 理學院進修一年。生平以「品管教士」自期。經常在中華民國品質管制學會的《品質管制月刊》和《管理雜誌》,以及<工商時報經營知識版>上也偶有發表,介紹 品質新理念。 著有《品質管理》、《全面品質經營》、《如何做好SPC》等數本書。志趣廣泛,尤其偏重在統計應用、品質理念的研究與推廣,並關心社會教育與環境保護。


GM 新成立 global product integrity organization; misled grieving families on lethal car flaw 點火開關隱患讓通用公司啟動大規模召回马克·胡德


Wide-Ranging Recall
The departures of General Motors’ chief spokesman and head Washington adviser, and its top human resources executive are the first major changes in the automaker’s senior management since a recall in February.
這種事,   Alfred Sloan 會如何處理?

用汽車公司(General Motors Co.)首席執行長Mary Barra稱,該公司計劃在其產品開發團隊中設立一個全球產品整合部門 ( 這翻譯有點問題: global product integrity organization) ,這一部門將涵蓋該公司不久前成立的產品安全部門。


通用汽車首席執行長Mary Barra稱,計劃在其產品開發團隊中設立一個名為global product integrity organization 的部門,該部門將涵蓋公司不久前成立的產品安全部門。

Henry Ford is rightly credited with inventing the assembly line—and with it mass production. But it was his great rival at General Motors (GM), Alfred Sloan, who really invented modern professional management. Sloan organised his company into divisions that specialised in cars “for every purse and purpose” and he fashioned a managerial class that turned GM into the world’s biggest company. His 1964 book, My Years with General Motors, is a cool explanation of how he did it (“management has been my specialisation,” he wrote flatly). It is a book that puts subsequent business autobiographies to shame.


GM's Opel Accelerates Its Path to Profitability1

  My Years with General Motors By Alfred Sloan  我與通用汽車公司  台北:協志,1971

Meggan Haller for The New York Times

底特律——在2005款雪佛蘭Cobalt型汽車兩英寸長的點火開關里,藏著馬克·胡德(Mark Hood)想要尋找的線索。

胡德是佛羅里達州的一名工程師。 2012年秋天,他曾給這個裝置拍了照片,用X光進行探查,並拆解了它。他把全部精力都放在了這個用塑料和金屬製成的、控制點火的小開關上。但在測試了幾個小時後,胡德仍然無法解釋布魯克·梅爾頓(Brooke Melton)的Cobalt汽車突然熄火的原因。 2010年在喬治亞州發生的那場交通事故奪去了梅爾頓的生命。

這對她的家人來說是一次重大打擊。為了起訴通用汽車(General Motors),他們聘請了胡德。






如今,這個修改背後的細節已經成為判定這家汽車製造商是否刻意隱瞞安全缺陷的關鍵所在。下週,通用汽車的首席執行官瑪麗·T·芭拉(Mary T. Barra)和美國汽車安全監管當局的最高官員戴維·弗里德曼(David Friedman)將就引發了大範圍車輛召回的一系列事件在參眾兩院作證。


梅爾頓家人的代理律師蘭斯·庫珀(Lance Cooper)說,“他們顯然更換了開關,我們已經向通用汽車證明了這一點。”






在一份證詞中,庫珀和Cobalt車型的點火開關首席工程師雷蒙德·德喬治(Raymond DeGiorgio)就原始開關和替換件之間的差異展開了正面交鋒。德喬治說,他看到了二者之間的差異,不過他無法解釋,為何部件發生了變化,相應的標號卻沒有做出改動。






此外,不是只有Cobalt車型才裝配了有缺陷的點火開關。除了2005年到2007年款的Cobalt之外,通用還召回了2007年款的Pontiac G5,2003年到2007年款的土星Ion(Saturn Ion);2006年到2007年款的雪佛蘭HHR和Pontiac Solstice; 2007年款的土星天空(Saturn Sky)。上週五,通用又在召回令裡添加了之後出廠的97.1萬輛Cobalt汽車和其他汽車。週五晚間,通用承認,在加拿大還有一樁和點火開關有關的死亡事故,該公司隨後把與點火開關缺陷有關的死亡事故數從12宗提升到了13宗。









GM misled grieving families on lethal car flaw

It had known about faulty switch in cars

NEW YORK — It was nearly five years ago that any doubts were laid to rest among engineers at General Motors about a dangerous and faulty ignition switch. At a meeting on May 15, 2009, they learned that data in the black boxes of Chevrolet Cobalts confirmed a potentially fatal defect existed in hundreds of thousands of cars.
But in the months and years that followed, as an expanding trove of internal documents and studies mounted, GM told the families of accident victims and other customers that it did not have enough evidence of any defect in their cars, interviews, letters, and legal documents show. Last month, GM recalled 1.6 million Cobalts and other small cars, saying that if the switch was bumped or weighed down it could shut off the engine’s power and disable air bags.
In one case, GM threatened to come after the family of an accident victim for reimbursement of legal fees if the family did not withdraw its lawsuit. In another instance, it dismissed a family with a terse, formulaic letter, saying there was no basis for claims.
“We sent the paperwork for the car to them and they said there’s nothing to this,” said Neil Kosilla, whose 23-year-old daughter, Amy, died in a Cobalt accident in March 2010 after the air bags failed to deploy. “They said we had nothing.”
Since the engineers’ meeting in May 2009, at least 23 fatal crashes have involved the recalled models, resulting in 26 deaths. GM reported the accidents to the government under a system called Early Warning Reporting, which requires automakers to disclose claims they receive blaming vehicle defects for serious injuries or deaths.
A New York Times review of 19 of those accidents — victims were identified through interviews with survivors, family members, lawyers, and law enforcement officials — found that GM pushed back against families in at least two of the accidents, and reached settlements that required the victims to keep the discussions confidential.
In other cases, GM ignored repeated calls, families said.
“We did call GM,” said Leslie Dueno, whose 18-year-old son, Christopher Hamberg, was killed June 12, 2009 — not quite a month after the critical May 15 meeting of GM engineers about the ignition data — while driving his 2007 Cobalt home before dawn in Houston. He lost control at 45 miles per hour and hit a curb, then a tree, the police report said. “Nobody ever called me. They never followed up. Ever.”
Last month’s recalls of the Cobalt and five other models encompassed model years 2003 through 2007. GM faces numerous inquiries, including one by the Justice Department, looking into the company’s disclosures in its 2009 bankruptcy filing, as well as what it told regulators.
“We are conducting an unsparing, comprehensive review of the circumstances leading to the ignition switch recall,” GM said Monday. “As part of that review we are examining previous claims and our response to them. If anything changes as a result of our review, we will promptly bring that to the attention of regulators.”
The company has said it has evidence of 12 deaths tied to the switch problem, but it has declined to give details other than to say they all occurred in 2009 or earlier. It says it has no conclusive evidence of more recent deaths tied to the switch.
“We are doing our best to get this right, which means reviewing the data with care,” the company said in its statement. “Not every Cobalt accident is a result of a faulty ignition switch. Accident claims and EWR” — Early Warning Reporting — “data are unique with their own set of facts and other relevant factors. It is wrong to use this information on a speculative basis. Each requires additional analysis and this will be a part of our review.”
It was unclear how many of the 26 deaths since the 2009 meeting were related to the faulty ignition, but some appeared to fit patterns that reflected the problem, such as an inexplicable loss of control or air bags that did not deploy. In some cases, the drivers had put themselves at risk, including having high blood-alcohol levels or texting.
Still, by the time Benjamin Hair, 20, crashed into a tree in Charlottesville, Va., on Dec. 13, 2009, while driving a Pontiac G5 home that Sunday morning, GM had conducted five internal studies about the ignition problem, company records indicate.
Though Hair was wearing his seat belt, he died after the car’s air bags failed to deploy.
“The police couldn’t tell us what caused the accident,” said Brenda, his mother. The Hairs contacted GM for answers, providing accident reports but no vehicle data, because the car’s black box had been destroyed. “They came back and said they’d presented it to their board of engineers, and they couldn’t say it was related” to a defect, Brenda Hair said.
By then, employees who knew about the switch problems ranged across the company, from its legal offices at headquarters in Detroit to its test tracks and research labs outside the city. GM lawyers had known of one fatal Cobalt accident in 2005, and had settled or worked on several cases. GM’s sales department had issued two service bulletins to dealers related to faulty switches, advising them to tell customers to drive without heavy key chains that could jostle the ignition and shut down the car.
In fall 2013, months after an eighth internal study on the ignition issue had been issued, GM moved to cut off the flow of damaging depositions related to one accident by settling a wrongful-death suit. The suit had been brought by the family of Jennifer Brooke Melton, 29, who lost control of her 2005 Cobalt on a Georgia highway in March 2010 when the key moved to the accessory position, shutting down power and air bags.
During the depositions, Lance Cooper, a lawyer for the Melton family, deposed Victor Hakim, a senior manager at GM. Cooper read more than 80 customer complaints into the official record that were filed with GM beginning in 2005 about Cobalts that unexpectedly stopped and stalled. GM settled the case on Sept. 13.
That same month, lawyers representing GM wrote to the lawyer in another wrongful-death case demanding that the lawsuit be withdrawn. The family of Allen Ray Floyd had sued GM after Floyd lost control of a 2006 Cobalt in daylight near Loris, S.C. Two weeks earlier, his sister had lost control of the same vehicle on the same road; she had it towed. The company contended the suit was “frivolous” because the accident occurred on July 3, 2009, a week before the company’s bankruptcy agreement took effect.